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ABSTRACT 
This study explores social capital and its relevance to bank risk taking across countries. Our 
empirical results show that the levels of bank risk taking are lower in countries with higher 
levels of social capital, and that the impact of social capital is mainly reflected by the reduced 
value of the standard deviation of return on assets. Moreover, the impact of social capital is 
found to be weaker when the legal system lacks strength. Furthermore, the study considers 
the impacts of social capital of the banks’ largest shareholders in these countries and finds 
that high levels of social capital present in these countries exert a negative effect on bank risk 
taking, but the effect is not strongly significant. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial system plays an important role in stimulating consumption and promoting 
economic growth. Schumpeter (1934) recognized the importance of well-developed financial 
intermediaries in economic development over a century ago. In short, Schumpeter argues that 
by lowering transaction costs, well-functioning financial intermediaries enhance economic 
growth by allocating capital to projects that yield higher returns. In contrast, undeveloped 
financial intermediaries, in particular the banks, threaten economic growth.  
Since the 1980s, there has been a profusion of banking crises in different countries. Japan 
suffered the largest losses over this period, with official estimates putting non-performing 
loans at about $400 billion in 1995. Unofficial estimates reach $1 trillion, or approximately 
25 per cent of Japanese GDP.4 In the early 1980s, Argentina most probably saw the largest 
relative loss, estimated variously at between 20 to 55 per cent of GDP. The US suffered the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007 and ensuing financial instability. These 
cases have focused economists’ attention on bank insolvency issues. Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) analyse the factors that cause bank insolvency, and the government’s responses to this. 
Demirgüҫ-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find a relationship between the existence of explicit 
deposit insurance and the likelihood of banking crises. Boyd, De Nicolò and Loukoianova 
(2009) construct a theoretical model for the banking industry and use both country-level and 
firm-level samples to examine the impacts of macroeconomic factors, market structure, 
deposit insurance and external shocks on the likelihood of banking crises. These studies focus 
on investigating the common factors that A growing body of literature also demonstrates how 
the regulatory architecture and the political environment affect the financial market. Kim and 
                                                              
4  Data source: Caprio, G. and Klingebiel, D., 1996.   
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Santomero (1988) investigate the role of capital regulation in bank risk management using a 
mean-variance model, and conclude that capital regulation encourages banks to adopt a 
higher risk portfolio. La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find that 
financial development is correlated with legal protection for investors, law enforcement, 
ownership concentration and the financial market. More recently, Laeven and Levine (2009) 
show that the impacts of bank stability and bank regulations on bank activities depend on the 
bank’s ownership concentration. Based on a sample of international bank flows from 26 
source countries to 120 recipient countries over several decades, Houston, Lin and Ma (2012) 
find that strong protection and limited regulation help attract international bank flows. 
However, to the extent of our knowledge, no existing literature discusses the impact of social 
capital.  
Social capital is a new concept with a complex and diverse definition. The World Bank 
defines social capital as the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society's social interactions. Some researchers have focused on the effects of 
social capital in the macro-environment, in areas such as global economic growth and 
industry growth. For example, La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) 
document a remarkable correlation between the trust prevailing in a country and the presence 
of large organizations, and find that levels of trust are lower in countries with dominant 
hierarchical religions. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that levels of social capital are higher in 
countries with faster economic growth. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) study the relationship 
between social interactions and individuals’ stock market participation. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004) argue that the role of social capital in financial development is positive and 
stronger when the level of human capital is lower. While others link social capital to financial 
markets, Besley and Coate (1995) relate social collateral to group lending programmes. To 
4 
 
our knowledge, very few studies have explored the connection between the level of social 
capital—especially that in the whole community—and the banking industry. This paper is the 
first study to investigate the relationship between social capital and bank risk taking across 
countries, and tests whether the effects of social capital become stronger in any particular 
country. The main finding shows that social capital exerts positive impacts on bank stability. 
In areas with higher levels of social capital, banks are less likely to go bankrupt. Moreover, 
we argue that when the legal system is relatively weak, the effect of social capital becomes 
weaker. From the perspective of robustness, the results generated from the subsample, which 
excludes the banks in the US, are found to be consistent with the benchmark, indicating that 
both trust and civic norms exert positive effects on bank stability. Finally, our study examines 
the impact of shareholders’ social capital and provides results that are consistent with those of 
previous studies. The findings indicate that the behaviour of shareholders is affected more by 
the social capital present in their place of residence than in their place of birth, as the latter 
exerts a negative and weaker impact on bank risk taking compared to the former.  
The the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and variables 
employed in the study. Section 3 sets out the hypotheses. Section 4 provides the empirical 
results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data  
2.1 Data sources 
The data used in this paper are compiled from two main sources: 
(1) Bank-level accounting information for approximately 2,000 banks is obtained from the 
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BankScope database, provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings. The BankScope 
database has comprehensive coverage in most countries, accounting for over 90% of all 
banking assets in each country. In this paper, the data covers the years 2004 to 2006. 
(2) Measurements of social capital come from the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted 
by a worldwide network of social scientists who study changing values and their impacts on 
social and political life. Five waves of surveys were conducted from 1981 to 2007. This paper 
employs the last wave of surveys conducted in 2005, extracting 73,322 observations 
concerning trust and 75,766 observations on civic norms. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1a shows the summary statistics for all key variables. Our sample contains 2,657 banks 
in 53 countries. The positive correlation, as shown in Table 1b and Table 1c, implicates that 
banks take less risk when the level of trust is higher and/or civic norms are stronger.  
2.2 Bank risk taking 
The measurement of bank risk taking employed in this study is the Z-score of each bank, 
calculated by dividing the sum of the return on assets (ROA) and the capital asset ratio (CAR) 
by the standard deviation of asset returns (σሺROAሻ).  
Z-score	ൌ ோை஺ା஼஺ோఙሺோை஺ሻ  
The Z-score measures the stability and the probability of insolvency of a bank, and has been 
used widely in the empirical banking and finance literature since Roy’s (1952) study. Boyd 
and Runkle (1993), De Nicoló (2000), Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2006), Laeven and Levine 
6 
 
(2009) and Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010) all utilize the Z-score as a measure of bank risk. 
Given that bank insolvency occurs when losses exceed equity, the probability of insolvency 
can be expressed as probሺെROA ൏ ܥܣܴሻ, where ROA is the return on assets and CAR is 
the capital asset ratio. If profits are normally distributed, the inverse probability of insolvency 
equals ሺROA ൅ CARሻ/σሺROAሻ, where σሺROAሻ is the standard deviation of ROA (Laeven 
and Levine，2009). The Z-score is monotonically associated with a bank’s stability, and a 
higher Z-score means a more stable bank. As shown in Figures 1a and 1b, the raw Z-score is 
highly skewed, so the natural logarithm of the Z-score (hereafter Z-score) is used as the risk 
indicator.  
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
The main sample is a cross-country database comprising 2,093 commercial banks in 161 
countries over the period 2004–2006, obtained from the BankScope database. ROA and 
CAR are calculated as the means for 2004–2006 and σሺROAሻ is the standard deviation of 
ROA estimated over the same time period. As shown in Table 1a, the mean of the Z-score is 
3.647, with a standard deviation of 1.324. These are similar to the values reported by Houston 
et al. (2010), who consider a longer period (average for 2000–2007) and report a mean 
Z-score of 3.240, with a standard deviation of 1.086. The fairly high standard deviation and 
the wide range of the Z-score shown by these statistics imply that there is a considerable 
amount of cross-sectional variation in the level of bank risk. 
2.3 Social capital 
As mentioned above, the “trust” and “civic” indicators are derived from the responses to the 
World Values Survey (WVS) on trust and civic norms. The 2005 WVS used the following 
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question to assess trust: “how much do you trust the people you meet for the first time?” Let 
the response “trust completely” equal to 1, “somewhat” equal to 0.67, “not very much” equal 
to 0.33, and “not trust at all” equal to 0. The trust indicator is thus the average score of 
respondents in each nation, after excluding responses of “no response”. For trust, 73,322 
observations from 51 countries are obtained. As Inglehart (1995) argues that some groups, 
such as city dwellers and better educated individuals, are oversampled in some countries, we 
follow Knack and Keefer (1997) and use the weighted variable provided in the data to 
compute the country-level mean. This gives a trust indicator covering 51 countries in 2005, 
with a mean of 0.394 and a standard deviation of 0.064. Larger values indicate higher levels 
of trust.  
To create the indicator of civic norms, respondents select whether each of the following 
behaviours “can always be justified, never be justified or something in between”.  
1) “Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to” 
2) “Avoiding a fare on public transport” 
3) “Cheating on taxes if you have the chance” 
Respondents chose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). In order for 
the values to be positively related to civic cooperation, these scales are reversed and summed 
over the three items to create a –civic indicator, with a 30-point maximum. The civic 
indicator has a mean of 24.070 and a standard deviation of 1.219; again, larger values 
indicate higher levels of social capital. 
By comparing the trust indicator with the results of another experiment conducted by 
Reader’s Digest (as reported in The Economist, 22 June 1996), Knack and Keefer (1997) 
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argue that non-random samples, translation problems and discrepancies between professed 
attitudes and actual behaviour do not produce severe noise in the measure of trust. The 
experiment on trust involved “accidentally” dropping wallets containing an amount of cash 
and the address and phone number of the “owner” in 20 cities in 14 different western 
European countries, and 12 US cities. Given that the percentage of wallets returned with their 
contents intact in each country was highly correlated with trust, at 0.67, these survey-based 
measures of social capital are reasonable. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) also argue that the relatively low correlation between trust related 
to the percentages of wallets returned with the contents and trust in family members shows 
that the measurement of trust in a country primarily captures “generalized” trust as opposed 
to “specific” trust placed in significant others, such as relatives and friends. As the aim here is 
to analyse the effect of country-level social capital (i.e., an indicator of generalized trust), 
rather than trust within a subgroup, the questions chosen are related to the level of trust in a 
person met for the first time, rather than in family or friends. 
The standard deviation of the civic indicator is lower than that of trust. The reason for the low 
variation across countries may be that respondents are reluctant to admit behaviour such as 
claiming government benefits they are not entitled to, cheating on taxes and avoiding fares 
for public transport. As this problem may introduce measurement errors into the civic 
construct, trust is used as the benchmark indicator, and civic is reported for robustness. 
There are two advantages in using the data from 2005. First, these data show the extent of 
trust more precisely as the responses contain four different levels of trust rather than two, as 
in other years. Second, the 2005 data are much more recent and cover more countries than the 
historical data widely used in previous literature. On the other hand, the data from 
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BankScope only cover the period 1997–2013, limiting the sample of banks as a substantial 
amount of data on return on assets is missing for earlier years. Furthermore, it is not 
reasonable to assume that trust and civic norms are consistent in all countries, especially after 
major events such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Iraq War in 2003. Therefore, 
this study only tests the data for the period around 2005, and does not include any panel 
regression. 
2.4 Macroeconomic and bank-level controls 
To control for the macroeconomic environment, the logarithm of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita and inflation rates are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database. For the legal system variable, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) database computed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) and a database on 
bank supervision assembled by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006). The WGI database 
measures the quality of governance for approximately 200 countries,5 while the database 
computed by Barth et al. (2006) covers entry restrictions for new banks, the government 
ownership of banks, and the restrictions on banks’ activities that hurt banking system 
performance. The Barth et al. database is based on a World Bank survey conducted in 152 
countries over the period 1999–2007, using the value of year 2005. 
In this paper, we employ bank-level controls such as bank size, the index of “too big to fail” 
and the ratio of loan loss reserves. Regarding banking market concentration, we examine the 
Cr4 index, which refers to the ratio of total deposits in the four largest banks to the total 
deposits within a given country. Other country-level macro-environment control variables are 
                                                              
5  Daniel  Kaufmann,  Aart  Kraay,  and  Massimo  Mastruzzi  (2009).  The  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  :  A 
Summary of Methodology. The data are also available at www.govindicators.org. 
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also tested, namely the natural logarithm of GDP per capita and the inflation rate (GDP 
deflator). To assess the legal system, the official supervisory power, the control of corruption 
and regulatory quality are examined, and the level of the legal system is defined by the first 
principal component of these three. 
3. Hypotheses 
As is well known, the main business of a commercial bank is deposit taking and loan 
providing. Such transactions are trust-sensitive and rely not only on the legal enforceability 
of contracts, but also on the trust between borrowers and lenders. Putnam, Leonardi and 
Nanetti (1993) refer to social capital as the networks, norms and trust in one community or 
nation, implying that the trust between community members belongs to an important aspect 
of social capital. From this perspective, it may be inferred that social capital exerts the same 
influence on borrowers and lenders. 
Social capital may increase the cost of contract violation for borrowers, reducing the 
likelihood of such violations and the risk borne by banks. If trust is an equilibrium outcome 
of a society (see Coleman,1990; Spagnolo, 1999), firms in areas with higher levels of social 
capital will make efforts to honour contracts as a result of the high cost of violation, as their 
operation relies to a considerable extent on social interactions. Thus, when a firm violates its 
contracts, it loses more than the legal penalties. On the other hand, if trust is a moral attitude 
(see Banfield & Banfield, 1958) held by a firm’s staff, a firm will constrain its behaviour as a 
result of its staff’s moral stance. In countries with higher levels of social capital, CEOs and 
managers of firms learn to keep their promises because establishing moral norms represents a 
larger coefficient in their utility functions. As a result, banks face lower risks of contract 
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violation by firms.  
For lenders, higher social capital may reduce the cost of financial contracts, improve their 
profitability and help them avoid bankruptcy through more efficient cooperation. When the 
level of social capital in a group is sufficiently high, written contracts may become relatively 
unimportant less important and inessential. A high level of social capital will reduce the cost 
of employing lawyers and the time spent on understanding complex contracts. As in the 
example given by Guiso et al. (2004), Jewish diamond merchants in New York do business 
without written contracts because of the extremely high level of social capital in their 
community. In the financial industry, the costs of labour and time are extremely high. If 
banks can save on these costs when establishing contracts, they can reduce their interest rates 
and make their products less risky to firms, and, as a result, reduce the risk they bear. As high 
levels of social capital are associated with high levels of social interaction and cooperation, 
which supposedly lead people to be less selfish and more public-spirited, repeated 
interactions result in lower levels of economic instability (Rodrik, 2000). Thus, in areas with 
higher levels of social capital, inter-bank and bank-firm cooperation is expected to be more 
efficient, and increasing the profitability of banks and reducing the probability of bank 
insolvency.  
Houston et al. (2010) claim that the sharing of information increases bank profitability, 
contributes to economic growth and reduces bank risk taking. Social capital may increase the 
quantity and quality of information and therefore help banks analyse the performance of 
firms and solve the problem of information asymmetry, which is alleviated in areas with high 
levels of social interaction as information circulates more frequently and freely. Lin (1999) 
suggests that social ties provide useful information concerning opportunities and choices in 
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imperfectly competitive markets, as high levels of social capital help bank managers make 
the right decisions by knowing the firms better. From this perspective, bank risks should be 
higher in countries with lower levels of social capital. Accordingly, we make the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: In countries with higher levels of social capital, bank risk taking is lower. 
However, it may be the case that social capital also has negative impacts. Some argue that 
lenders may have the problem of overconfidence, as high levels of trust may encourage 
lenders to provide capital to risky borrowers. Overly trusting shareholders, for example, 
might exert an undue influence. Based on this argument, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Social capital has negative effects as well as positive effects, because people 
are overconfident or overly trusting.  
Social capital may influence bank risk taking by influencing both lenders’ and borrowers’ 
behaviour. It is known that legal systems influence financial markets (La Porta et al., 1998). 
In all economies, a sound legal system guarantees the enforcement of contracts and the 
incentives for loan activities by increasing the costs of contract violation for borrowers. Thus, 
the legal system  works in a similar way to social capital. On this basis, the following 
hypothesis is developed:  
Hypothesis 3: A strong legal system strengthens the effects of social capital on bank risk 
taking.  
A person’s behavior is influenced by the level of social capital in the area where they live, 
instead of in the area where they was born (Guiso et al., 2004). Coleman (1990) considers 
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trust as an equilibrium outcome of a society, whether an individual chooses to fulfill his 
promise depends on the punishment for breaking the promise, and the punishment is 
determined by the level of social interaction in his country of residence. Banfield and 
Banfield (1958) also point out that trust is a moral attitude imprinted with education; the level 
of social capital in the place where an individual grew up has a stronger impact on the 
individual than the level of social capital of the place of birth. From this perspective, it is 
possible to infer that the behavior of CEOs and managers of firms reflect the level of social 
capital of the place where the firms are located, rather than where the major shareholders of 
the firm are from. Meanwhile, firms’ and banks’ behavior reflect their staff’s moral attitudes. 
Although the moral attitudes of banks’ major shareholders also influence the behavior of a 
bank, the impacts are indirect and not as strong as those from the majority of staff. This leads 
to the fourth and final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Bank risk taking is not affected as strongly by the level of social capital in the 
country of residence of major shareholders, as by the level of social capital in the countries 
in which the banks operate.  
4. Results    
4.1 Social capital and bank risk taking 
To test Hypothesis 1, a benchmark regression model was estimated: 
ܼ௜௝ ൌ α ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ௝ ൅ ߚଶܺଶ௜௝ ൅ ߚଷܺଷ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝               (1 ) 
where subscripts i and j indicate the bank and country respectively. Zij is a log Z-score; α is 
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the constant; εij is the random disturbance term; X1 refers to the key variables of interest: trust 
and civic; X2 is a vector of bank-level control variables, including bank size, too-big-to-fail 
and the rate of loan loss reserves (LLR); and X3 is a vector of country-level control variables, 
including market concentration, inflation, log GDP per capita, deposit insurance coverage 
and the legal system (official supervisory power, control of corruption and regulatory 
quality). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Tables 2a and 2b present the results for the relationship between social capital and bank risk 
taking. Table 2 shows four model specifications: Model 1 is a simple regression model 
between bank risk taking and social capital without the inclusion of any control variables; in 
Models 2, 3 and 4, groups of bank-level and country-level control variables are incorporated 
one by one. Regardless of which model is considered, the main results remain unchanged. 
Table 2a indicates a significantly positive impact of trust on the Z-score, implying a negative 
impact on bank risk taking. Moreover, the results still hold even when replacing trust with the 
civic variable to proxy the levels of social capital (see Table 2b). However, the impact of 
civic norms on the degree of bank risk taking is relatively small compared to that of trust, 
which may be due to the different measurement ranges of the indicators. In sum, the 
empirical results support the main hypothesis: social capital exerts a negative and significant 
effect on bank risk taking, thus reducing the probability of bank insolvency.  
A banking crisis occurs when a large number of bank clients withdraw their deposits, because 
of a strong belief that banks may fail and become bankrupt. Based on the empirical results, 
social capital is found to decrease the degree of bank risk taking. Thus, countries with higher 
levels of social capital are less likely to experience banking crises, as the higher degree of 
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interpersonal trust decreases the probability of banks runs. Our result provides policy 
implications for governments: such crises can be avoided by improving the level of social 
capital in a country. 
4.1.1 Subsample analysis: excluding banks in the United States 
Subsample robustness tests are conducted to prevent some large banks in a few key countries 
from exerting an overly strong influence on the results. Given that the US has the largest 
number of banks in the sample, we follow Houston et al. (2010) and re-estimate the models 
after removing the data from US banks. Table 3 shows the impact of trust and civic norms on 
bank risk taking, excluding the data for US banks.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Consistent with the benchmark model, the effects of trust and civic norms on bank risk taking 
are significantly positive, even after excluding the banks in the US. Higher levels of trust or 
strong civic norms lead to less bank risk taking.  
4.2 Channels: how does social capital work? 
As mentioned above, social capital exerts positive effects on bank risk taking, but the effects 
can also be negative. In this section, we discuss both these positive and negative effects.  
To gain a clearer view of how social capital affects bank risk taking both positively and 
negatively, three components of the Z-score (i.e., ROA, CAR and σሺROAሻ) are used as 
separate dependent variables.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4, it can be observed that social capital tends to reduce bank risk taking, mainly by 
reducing the standard deviation of ROA. Both the trust coefficient and the civic coefficient 
are significantly negative, with the trust coefficient strongly significant at the 1% level. The 
lower standard deviation of ROA refers to higher stability of banks. However, trust seems to 
reduce the values for both ROA and CAR, indicating that negative effects do exist and 
proving Hypothesis 2. Banks prefer to hold less capital and more assets in countries with 
higher levels of trust. Additionally, low CAR increases the probability of bank insolvency. In 
countries with higher levels of social capital, the lower ROA of banks indicates poorer 
performance, and also implies bank instability.  
To further test Hypothesis 2, the coefficients of trust are compared to those of civic. As the 
overconfidence problem is attributed mainly to high levels of trust but not strong civic norms, 
civic should not have significantly negative effects, which is proved by our test. Banks are 
over-trusting lenders in countries with higher levels of social capital, and therefore they tend 
to reduce CAR and lend money to unqualified or risky borrowers. Strong civic norms do not 
significantly decrease the CAR or ROA of banks, but do stabilize ROA. 
4.3 The effects of the legal system on social capital 
Here, we consider whether the legal system improves or hinders the effects of social capital 
on bank risk taking. The interaction terms “trust_low pol” and “civic_low pol” are added to 
the model; “low pol” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the level of the legal system is lower 
than the average of the sample. To define the legal system, a variable “pol” is created, which 
is the first principal component of the three political variables: “official supervisory power”, 
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“control of corruption” and “regulatory quality”. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
From Table 5, it is apparent that the effects of both the trust and civic variables are lower in 
countries with weaker legal systems than in countries with stronger legal systems, and that 
these differences are significant at the 1% level. Therefore, it can be inferred that the legal 
system does not hinder but promotes the positive effects of social capital on bank risk taking, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
4.4 The effects of social capital in shareholders’ countries 
To test the hypothesis that bank risk taking is affected mainly by the levels of social capital in 
the shareholders’ country of residence rather than the country in which the bank is located, 
the levels of social capital in the countries of residence of the largest shareholders are 
examined. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Employing data on the countries of residence of the largest shareholders of 1,831 banks from 
the BankScope database, the models are re-estimated and the results are presented in Table 6. 
The regression coefficients of trust and civic norms for the largest shareholder’s country of 
residence are lower than those for the country of registration. This shows that the levels of 
social capital in the major shareholders’ countries of residence do not affect the behaviour of 
banks as strongly as those in the countries in which the banks operate, supporting Hypothesis 
4. However, it is interesting to note that the impact of trust in the major shareholder’s country 
on bank risk taking becomes negative.   
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This may explain why some well-known international banks are not able to perform better 
than domestic banks in developing countries: neither the high social capital of the largest 
shareholder’s country nor the low social capital of the company’s country of registration 
leads to stable performance. The strategy of lending set by major shareholders may be too 
loose to control bank risk taking in countries with lower levels of social capital.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the impacts of social capital on bank risk taking. By using indicators of 
trust and civic norms from WVS data, it is found that the levels of social capital present in the 
bank shareholders’ countries of residence exert a positive impact on bank stability. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of trust and civic norms are still significant after eliminating US 
data. The findings suggest that high levels of social capital in the countries of residence tend 
to reduce the probability of bank insolvency and increase the stability of the banking industry. 
However, high levels of trust also bring problems, as being overly trusting may exert a 
negative influence on the return on assets and the capital-asset ratio. Even so, the negative 
effects are dominated by the positive ones.  
Second, the results of the empirical analysis show that the impacts of trust on bank risk taking 
are stronger in countries with stronger legal systems, as these countries are more capable of 
regulating the behaviour of their citizens and firms. As constructing a better institutional 
environment and building a society with a high level of social capital and a well-developed 
political/legal system help avoid bank crises, it is suggested that governments should pay 
more attention to build up social capital when working on economic development of the 
country.  
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Finally, our study examines the relationship between the levels of social capital in each 
bank’s largest shareholder’s country and the risk faced by banks. The empirical results in this 
paper prove our prediction that the shareholder’s country of residence exerts a weaker and 
negative effect, suggesting that bank strategy should be based predominantly on the social 
environment of the countries in which branches are located. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of Z-score 
Figure 1a and 1b present the results of the kernel density estimation of raw Z-score and the natural 
logarithm of Z-score, respectively. 
Figure 1a: 
 
Figure 1b: 
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Table A: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
 
Original sources 
Bank-level data 
   
Z-score Equals log of ሺROA ൅ CARሻ/σሺROAሻ, 
where ROA ൌ π/A is return on assets and 
CAR ൌ E/A is capital-asset ratio, both 
averaged over the years 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets, averaged 
over 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Too-big-to-fail A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the bank's share in the country's total 
deposits exceeds 10%. 
 BankScope 
LLR (%) Loan loss reserves divided by gross loans, 
averaged over the years 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
    
Country-level data    
Trust "Trust" is the average score of responses in 
each nation to the question "how much do 
you trust the people you meet for the first 
time", after removing blank responses. For 
each response, "trust completely" equals to 
1, “somewhat” equals to 0.67, “not very 
much” equals to 0.33, and “not trust at all” 
equals to 0. 
 World Values 
Survey (WVS) 
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Civic "Civic" is the average score of responses in 
each country responding to 3 questions on 
civic norms. For each question, respondents 
chose a number from 1 to 10. We reversed 
these scales and summed values over the 
three items in each country to create a scale 
(Civic) ranging from 3 to 30. 
 World Values 
Survey (WVS) 
Trust_low pol “Trust_low pol” is an interaction term of 
Trust and the dummy variable “low pol”. 
“low pol” is equal to 1 if the political index 
is lower than the average of the sample. 
  
Civc_low pol “Civc_low pol” is an interaction term of 
Civc and the dummy variable “low pol”. 
“low pol” is equal to 1 if the political index 
is lower than the average of the sample. 
  
Trust_sh “Trust_sh” is the trust index of banks’ 
biggest shareholder. 
 WDI 
CR4 CR4 is equal to the sum of the deposits of 
the four largest banks to total deposits 
within a given country. 
 BankScope 
Log GDP per capita Log real GDP per capita, in US dollars.  WDI 
Inflation (%) Percentage inflation rate, GDP deflator.  WDI 
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Table A (continued) 
Official supervisory power Whether the supervisory authorities 
have the authority to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct 
problems. The value from the year 
2005 is used. 
Barth, Caprio 
and Levine 
(2006) 
Regulatory Quality The indicator measures the ability of 
the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
market competition and private sector 
development. The value from the year 
2005 is used. 
Kaufmann, kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2009) 
Control of corruption The indicator measures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. The value from the 
year 2005 is used. 
Kaufmann, kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2009) 
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Table B: List of Trust and Civic by country in 2005  
Country Trust Civic Country Trust Civic 
Andorra 0.3003 24.9405 Mali 0.4103 23.2757 
Argentina 0.3559 25.3563 Mexico 0.2276 21.9738 
Australia 0.4648 26.8798 Moldova 0.2349 22.9342 
Brazil 0.2129 22.6683 Morocco 0.2952 27.2625 
Britain 0.4496 26.1996 Netherlands 0.3431 27.2852 
Bulgaria 0.3265 26.1282 New Zealand 26.9909 
Burkina Faso 0.3358 25.5018 Norway 0.5585 26.3665 
Canada 0.4669 27.1228 Peru 0.1630 
Chile 0.2214 23.0208 Poland 0.3506 25.7076 
China 0.3012 25.8996 Romania 0.2509 26.5964 
Colombia 0.2357 Russia 0.2504 23.4051 
Cyprus 0.2199 26.1080 Rwanda 0.3964 26.0441 
Egypt 0.3616 27.5469 Serbia 0.3369 19.0377 
Ethiopia 0.3595 27.4191 Slovenia 0.2347 24.3958 
Finland 0.4896 26.5040 South Africa 0.3455 25.2326 
France 0.4389 24.1913 South Korea 0.2879 25.9122 
Georgia 0.3307 27.6790 Spain 0.3699 26.0158 
Germany 0.3431 26.5437 Sweden 0.5644 26.1284 
Ghana 0.2939 26.9647 Switzerland 0.4691 27.5280 
Guatemala 23.2349 Taiwan 0.3533 26.3725 
Hong Kong 26.1950 Thailand 0.2995 22.8030 
India 0.3420 23.7596 Trinidad 0.2806 25.1282 
Indonesia 0.3306 27.7448 Turkey 0.2550 28.1922 
Iran 24.7129 Ukraine 0.3018 22.6730 
Italy 0.3102 27.1118 Uruguay 0.3729 25.9017 
Japan  27.8927 USA 0.4346 26.4236 
Jordan 0.3151 26.8428 Vietnam 0.3668 26.9087 
Malaysia 0.2600 21.6958 Zambia 0.2491 22.6141 
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Table 1a: Summary statistics 
In Table 1a, we describe the data, where columns 2-8 present the mean, standard deviation, minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and the max values. 
Table 1b and Table 1c report the correlations between the main regression variables, where trust and civic are measures of social capital. All definitions of 
variables can be found in Table A.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Bank-level data 
Z-score 3.647466 1.323589 -2.8062 2.80841 3.60044 4.37297 9.63605 
Bank size 12.317 2.349 4.098 10.692 12.1752 13.834 20.291 
Too-big-to-fail 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 1.000 
Loan loss reserves 5.823 10.327 -0.050 1.355 2.79 6.275 100.000 
Country-level data 
Trust 0.394 0.064 0.160 0.421 0.420701 0.421 0.567 
Civic 24.070 1.219 14.503 24.392 24.3923 24.392 26.938 
CR4 0.464 0.211 0.236 0.364 0.364 0.415 1.000 
Inflation (%) 4.516 14.176 -0.01 3.1 3.1 3.1 560.39 
Log GDP per capita 10.026 1.191 4.87 10.17 10.66 10.66 11.72 
Official supervisory power 12.158 1.788 4 12 13 13 14 
Control of corruption 1.038 0.937 -1.607 0.892 1.534 1.534 2.352 
Regulatory quality 1.155 0.809 -2.250 1.098 1.613 1.613 1.854 
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Table 1b: Correlation matrix of main regression variables – Trust 
 
Z-score Trust 
Bank 
size 
LLR 
Too big 
to fail 
CR4 Inflation 
Log 
GDP / 
capita
Official 
supervisory 
power
Control of 
corruption 
Regulatory 
quality 
Z-score 1.0000 
 
Trust 0.2597 1.0000 
         
Bank size 0.0276 0.2213 1.0000 
        
LLR -0.1305 -0.2177 -0.1918 1.0000 
       
Too big to fail -0.0510 -0.1581 0.2878 0.0164 1.0000 
      
CR4 -0.0510 0.0484 0.4657 0.0053 0.3469 1.0000 
     
Inflation -0.1537 -0.5234 -0.672 0.2382 -0.105 -0.6292 1.0000 
    
Log GDP / capita 0.2342 0.6895 0.4686 -0.2562 -0.1256 0.1736 -0.7875 1.0000 
   
Official supervisory power 0.1492 0.4315 0.1865 -0.1034 -0.0717 0.0906 -0.3247 0.3246 1.0000 
  
Control of corruption 0.1832 0.6790 0.5892 -0.2325 0.0348 0.5049 -0.9197 0.8704 0.4609 1.0000 
 
Regulatory quality 0.2200 0.6828 0.5778 -0.2697 0.0023 0.3572 -0.8959 0.9167 0.4511 0.9642 1.0000 
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Table 1c: Correlation matrix of main regression variables - Civic 
 
Z-score Civic 
Bank 
size 
LLR 
Too big 
to fail 
CR4 Inflation 
Log 
GDP / 
capita 
Official 
supervisory 
power 
Control of 
corruption 
Regulatory 
quality 
Z-score 1.0000                     
Civic 0.1995 1.0000
         
Bank size 0.0284 0.4857 1.0000
        
LLR -0.1311 -0.1716 -0.1924 1.0000
       
Too big to fail -0.0418 0.0244 0.2885 0.0165 1.0000
      
CR4 -0.0461 0.4535 0.4667 0.006 0.3372 1.0000
     
Inflation -0.1577 -0.752 -0.6738 0.2384 -0.0941 -0.6269 1.0000 
    
Log GDP / capita 0.2318 0.6889 0.473 -0.2575 -0.1146 0.1845 -0.7975 1.0000
   
Official supervisory 
power 
0.1528 0.4119 0.1845 -0.1033 -0.0871 0.0836 -0.3221 0.3318 1.0000
  
Control of 
corruption 
0.1824 0.7448 0.5909 -0.2327 0.0411 0.5115 -0.9244 0.8714 0.4638 1.0000
 
Regulatory quality 0.2191 0.7541 0.5801 -0.27 0.0088 0.3637 -0.9009 0.9174 0.4547 0.9643 1.0000
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Table 2: Benchmark model  
Tables 2a and 2b present the effects of trust and civic norms on the bank risk-taking. The sample 
contains 1536 banks across 55 countries. Key variables: trust and civic are from the 2005 surveys of 
WVS. The dependent variable, Z-score, and other control variables are averaged over the years 
2004-2006. Column 1 presents the effects of trust on bank risk-taking, without control variables. 
Column 2 presents the results with bank-level control variables. Column 3 presents the results with 
both bank-level and industry-level control variables. In Column 4, country-level control variables are 
added in the model, based on Column 3. The *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels respectively. 
Table 2a: Estimation results – Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Trust 2.035*** 2.378*** 2.368*** 2.169*** 
 (6.969) (7.346) (7.317) (4.284) 
Bank size  -0.0274* -0.0179 -0.0528*** 
  (-1.811) (-1.093) (-2.693) 
LLR  -0.0137*** -0.0132*** -0.00901** 
  (-3.166) (-3.035) (-2.104) 
Too big to fail  0.00289 0.0607 0.203 
  (0.0194) (0.394) (1.204) 
Cr4   -0.240 -0.0660 
   (-1.531) (-0.217) 
Inflation    -0.0423 
    (-1.393) 
Log gdp per capita    0.149 
    (1.594) 
Official supervisory power    0.0444** 
    (2.154) 
Control of corruption    -0.589*** 
    (-3.258) 
Regulatory quality    0.546** 
    (2.272) 
Constant 3.110*** 3.415*** 3.404*** 2.127* 
 (32.87) (17.69) (17.63) (1.896) 
Observations 1,536 1,374 1,374 1,277 
R-squared 0.031 0.054 0.056 0.099 
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Table 2b: Estimation results – Civic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Civic 0.0883*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 0.0849*** 
 (5.026) (5.563) (6.464) (2.748) 
Bank size  -0.0426** -0.0286* -0.0711*** 
  (-2.542) (-1.672) (-3.621) 
LLR  -0.0172*** -0.0153*** -0.0104** 
  (-3.986) (-3.541) (-2.430) 
Too big to fail  -0.115 0.0530 0.290* 
  (-0.758) (0.335) (1.653) 
Cr4   -0.605*** -0.653** 
   (-3.612) (-2.096) 
Inflation    -0.0447 
    (-1.414) 
Log gdp per capita    0.121 
    (1.254) 
Official supervisory power    0.0430** 
    (1.982) 
Control of corruption    -0.241 
    (-1.364) 
Regulatory quality    0.268 
    (1.085) 
Constant 1.687*** 1.706*** 1.199*** 1.691 
 (4.137) (4.033) (2.701) (1.413) 
     
Observations 1,526 1,366 1,366 1,269 
R-squared 0.016 0.039 0.048 0.092 
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Table 3: Robustness checks: excluding US  
Table 3 examines the results of the impact of trust and civic norms on Z-score, excluding US values. *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES zscore Zscore Zscore Zscore 
Trust 1.860***  1.223**  
 (5.872)  (2.143)  
Civic  0.0757***  0.0704** 
  (4.036)  (2.236) 
Bank size   -0.0382* -0.0487** 
   (-1.704) (-2.147) 
LLR   -0.00824* -0.00898** 
   (-1.884) (-2.052) 
Too big to fail   0.181 0.263 
   (1.038) (1.452) 
Cr4   -1.121*** -1.678*** 
   (-2.726) (-4.436) 
Inflation   -0.0426 -0.0473 
   (-1.364) (-1.455) 
Log gdp per capita   -0.0383 -0.102 
   (-0.359) (-0.949) 
Official supervisory power   -0.258 -0.00363 
   (-1.270) (-0.0195) 
Control of corruption   0.773*** 0.614** 
   (3.075) (2.363) 
Regulatory quality   0.0588*** 0.0569** 
   (2.754) (2.559) 
Constant 3.138*** 1.942*** 4.277*** 4.104*** 
 (31.82) (4.504) (3.347) (3.124) 
     
Observations 1,321 1,311 1,068 1,060 
R-squared 0.025 0.012 0.110 0.111 
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Table 4: Three components of Z-score as dependent variables 
Table 4 tests the main regression function using the three components of Z-score as dependent 
variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ROA CAR σ(ROA) ROA CAR σ(ROA) 
       
Trust -2.543* -15.26** -3.022***    
 (-1.733) (-2.011) (-4.173)    
Civic    -0.127 -0.564 -0.0755* 
    (-1.398) (-1.186) (-1.705) 
Bank size 0.0932 -2.824*** -0.125*** 0.108* -2.712*** -0.101*** 
 (1.618) (-9.478) (-4.470) (1.878) (-9.028) (-3.602) 
LLR -0.113*** -0.231*** 0.0617*** -0.116*** -0.236*** 0.0636***
 (-9.702) (-3.712) (10.06) (-10.03) (-3.755) (10.31) 
Too big to fail 0.238 -0.263 -0.270 0.0627 0.413 -0.299 
 (0.481) (-0.103) (-1.119) (0.121) (0.152) (-1.187) 
Cr4 1.930** 13.96*** 0.865** 2.702*** 17.20*** 1.520*** 
 (2.136) (2.979) (1.987) (2.936) (3.570) (3.399) 
Inflation 0.283*** 0.963** 0.0470 0.276*** 0.907* 0.0452 
 (3.230) (2.124) (1.083) (3.010) (1.891) (0.997) 
Log gdp per capita 0.803*** 4.488*** 0.0582 0.843*** 4.751*** 0.0721 
 (2.866) (3.091) (0.434) (2.959) (3.186) (0.523) 
Official supervisory power 0.409*** 1.539*** 0.00320 0.415*** 1.577*** 0.00145 
 (6.781) (4.920) (0.109) (6.546) (4.746) (0.0468) 
Control of corruption -1.113** -2.966 0.714*** -1.581*** -5.381** 0.275 
 (-2.070) (-1.066) (2.763) (-3.025) (-1.970) (1.085) 
Regulatory quality 0.421 0.286 -0.557 0.802 1.767 -0.272 
 (0.581) (0.0762) (-1.621) (1.085) (0.457) (-0.769) 
Constant -13.05*** -12.71 1.861 -11.89*** -9.939 1.936 
 (-3.917) (-0.735) (1.159) (-3.377) (-0.539) (1.128) 
       
Observations 1,574 1,573 1,280 1,556 1,555 1,272 
R-squared 0.105 0.127 0.155 0.110 0.125 0.146 
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Table 5: Social capital and bank risk - taking: when political power is low    
This table tests whether the impact of social capital is different when political power is low. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust 1.911*** 2.242*** 3.744***    
 (6.436) (6.856) (6.070)    
Trust_low pol -0.562** -0.737*** -1.909***    
 (-2.222) (-2.661) (-4.406)    
Civic    0.0593*** 0.0822*** 0.0990*** 
    (3.084) (3.728) (3.181) 
Civic_low pol    -0.0138*** -0.0162*** -0.0247*** 
    (-3.668) (-4.022) (-3.033) 
Bank size  -0.0380** -0.0473**  -0.0509*** -0.0694*** 
  (-2.431) (-2.424)  (-3.033) (-3.545) 
LLR  -0.0132*** -0.00891**  -0.0149*** -0.0104** 
  (-3.057) (-2.096)  (-3.449) (-2.426) 
Too big to fail  0.0265 0.199  -0.0267 0.286 
  (0.177) (1.188)  (-0.175) (1.636) 
Cr4   0.476   -0.105 
   (1.459)   (-0.293) 
Inflation   -0.0337   -0.0405 
   (-1.118)   (-1.282) 
Log gdp per capita   0.180*   0.175* 
   (1.928)   (1.797) 
Official supervisory power   -0.00415   0.0118 
   (-0.179)   (0.491) 
Control of corruption -0.949*** -0.544***
   (-4.812)   (-2.685) 
Regulatory quality   0.695***   0.349 
   (2.885)   (1.410) 
Constant 3.256*** 3.718*** 1.881* 2.589*** 2.804*** 1.325 
 (28.32) (16.62) (1.687) (5.454) (5.591) (1.105) 
Observations 1,536 1,374 1,277 1,526 1,366 1,269 
R-squared 0.034 0.059 0.113 0.025 0.050 0.099 
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Table 6: Social capital of the shareholder’s country 
This table presents the relationship between bank risk-taking and social capital of the country of the biggest shareholder. The dependent variable is log 
Z-score averaged over the years 2004-2006. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
Z-score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Trust 1.627*** 1.956*** 1.961*** 2.223**     
 (3.193) (3.526) (3.533) (2.552)     
Trust_sh -0.692** -0.487 -0.415 -0.926***     
 (-2.240) (-1.566) (-1.278) (-2.831) 
Civic     -0.00562 0.0421 0.0859* 0.0540 
     (-0.162) (0.973) (1.690) (0.809) 
Civic_sh     0.0318** 0.0238* 0.0161 0.0175 
     (2.479) (1.853) (1.185) (1.127) 
Bank size  -0.0564** -0.0460 -0.0167  -0.0665** -0.0522* -0.0358 
  (-2.118) (-1.537) (-0.533)  (-2.247) (-1.693) (-1.113) 
LLR  -0.00525 -0.00503 -0.00164  -0.00687 -0.00653 -0.00234 
  (-0.709) (-0.678) (-0.233)  (-0.924) (-0.880) (-0.329) 
Too big to fail  0.0979 0.163 0.0237  0.00689 0.146 0.179 
 (0.453) (0.702) (0.0906) (0.0316) (0.624) (0.653)
Cr4   -0.217 0.379   -0.525 -0.711 
   (-0.767) (0.638)   (-1.634) (-1.232) 
Inflation    0.000683    -0.0176 
    (0.0129)    (-0.294) 
Log gdp per capita    0.288    0.116 
    (1.605)    (0.620) 
Official supervisory power    0.208***    0.169*** 
    (5.154)    (4.079) 
Control of corruption    -0.999***    -0.516* 
    (-2.897)    (-1.665) 
Regulatory quality 0.921** 0.686*
    (2.330)    (1.680) 
Constant 3.419*** 3.918*** 3.855*** -1.693 3.080*** 2.976*** 2.195** -0.0615 
 (20.46) (12.53) (11.92) (-0.779) (4.473) (3.964) (2.468) (-0.0261) 
Observations 567 512 512 479 563 509 509 476 
R-squared 0.022 0.036 0.037 0.122 0.014 0.026 0.031 0.105 
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